LG TVs Could Capture IPs, Voice Transcripts in Privacy Investigation

An investigation into LG smart TVs has raised significant privacy and security concerns after researchers demonstrated that tested sets could identify devices on local networks and, under certain conditions, capture and store voice-related information. The investigation also demonstrated vulnerabilities that researchers said could allow a compromised television to access microphones and other connected hardware.

The findings, published by Gamers Nexus in September 2026 with Level1Techs and independent security researchers, have been strongly disputed by LG. The company says its TVs do not continuously record or transmit ambient conversations and that voice processing only begins after an activated voice interaction, such as pressing the remote’s voice button or using an enabled wake word. LG does acknowledge that its smart TVs perform device discovery and that optional features such as Automatic Content Recognition (ACR) can process information for content and advertising-related functions.

Key takeaways

• Researchers found tested LG TVs could scan local networks and identify other devices, including phones, computers, printers and smart-home equipment.
• The investigation reported collection of information including internal IP addresses and nearby Wi-Fi details.
• Researchers demonstrated voice data being converted into text and stored on a tested television under an activated voice-recognition scenario.
• They also demonstrated microphone and webcam capture after exploiting vulnerabilities in the television’s software.
• The investigation does not prove that all LG TVs continuously record household conversations.
• LG says voice data is processed only during an activated voice interaction and denies continuously recording ambient conversations.
• LG says local network/device discovery is a standard smart-TV function and that ACR is optional.
• The investigation is especially significant because LG also operates a large advertising business, LG Ad Solutions, built around television viewing and household-device data.

What the LG TV privacy investigation found

The investigation was conducted by Gamers Nexus in collaboration with Level1Techs and security researchers MrBruh and uturn.

The team examined retail LG smart TVs, network traffic and elements of the webOS operating system. The researchers used tools including Wireshark to observe network activity and conducted firmware and security testing to determine what information the televisions could access.

One of the most important findings involved local-network discovery.

During testing, an LG television identified dozens of devices connected to the same network. The researchers reported finding smartphones, computers, smartwatches, printers, servers, thermostats and other equipment.

This does not necessarily mean that LG was secretly reading the contents of those devices.

The more specific issue is that the television was capable of discovering that those devices existed and obtaining information associated with them.

Researchers reported seeing internal IP addresses, device names and information about nearby Wi-Fi networks.

For a television, that level of network visibility can be surprising to consumers.

A smart TV needs some network functionality to communicate with streaming services, discover compatible devices and support features such as casting or external-device control. But users may not expect their television to have visibility into other equipment connected to their home network.

Why IP addresses matter

An IP address is essentially a network identifier.

A public IP address can help identify a household’s internet connection and, depending on the circumstances, provide information useful for estimating geographic location.

An internal or private IP address identifies devices inside a local network.

Seeing an internal IP address does not automatically mean a company knows everything about the device behind it. But a collection of device identifiers can provide a useful picture of the digital environment surrounding a smart TV.

The investigation reported that tested LG TVs could identify internal IP addresses belonging to other devices and gather information about nearby wireless networks.

Researchers also reported information such as Wi-Fi network names, signal strength and channel information.

LG says its device-discovery functionality exists to support connectivity with compatible devices and is separate from its advertising systems.

The company also says nearby Wi-Fi information can be processed separately for approximate-location purposes where applicable ACR services are enabled and the relevant agreements have been accepted.

That distinction is important.

The existence of a technical capability does not by itself establish how the data is ultimately used.

The privacy question is therefore not simply whether an LG TV can see devices on a network. It is what information is collected, why it is collected, where it goes, how long it is retained and what consent the user has provided.

The voice-transcript finding is more complicated

The investigation’s most alarming claim concerns voice data.

Researchers said they were able to retrieve plain-text transcripts from a tested LG television.

According to the investigation, after voice functionality was activated, speech picked up by the television could be converted into text and stored in system logs.

The researchers used controlled demonstrations to show that information spoken near the television could appear in those logs.

That is materially different from proving that LG routinely records every conversation taking place in front of its televisions.

The distinction matters because the investigation involved both ordinary functionality and security exploitation.

LG’s official position is that speech-to-text processing starts only after a user activates a supported voice interaction through a wake word or the voice button on the remote. The company says wake-word detection itself is processed locally and that audio without a recognized wake word is not converted into text, stored or transmitted.

LG also says that once an active voice session begins, nearby sounds can sometimes appear in speech-recognition results.

In other words, LG acknowledges that voice recognition can process speech during an activated session, but rejects the interpretation that the television continuously records ambient conversations.

The “TV is off” issue needs careful wording

The investigation attracted attention partly because researchers demonstrated microphone capture while the TV’s display appeared to be off.

That sounds straightforward, but “screen off” and “completely powered down” are not necessarily the same thing.

Modern smart TVs can remain in standby rather than being electrically disconnected. Components can continue operating to support wake-word detection, network functions, software updates and other features.

LG’s own explanation confirms that supported televisions with hands-free voice control enabled can monitor for a wake word while in standby.

The company says that audio used for wake-word detection is processed locally and deleted if the wake word is not recognized.

The Gamers Nexus investigation, however, went further by demonstrating how vulnerabilities could be used to manipulate a television and obtain microphone recordings.

That creates two separate questions:

First: What does the television normally do when operating according to LG’s intended software behavior?

Second: What can an attacker do if vulnerabilities allow unauthorized access to the television?

Those questions should not be combined.

A vulnerable television being turned into a covert listening device does not prove that LG intentionally designed every television to continuously spy on owners.

At the same time, demonstrating that an attacker could potentially obtain microphone data from a device inside someone’s home is a legitimate security concern.

Security vulnerabilities could make the privacy issue worse

The investigation did not focus exclusively on advertising or data collection.

Researchers also reported security vulnerabilities affecting LG’s webOS smart-TV platform.

The team demonstrated techniques that could give an attacker greater control over the television.

Some technical details were withheld while researchers pursued responsible disclosure.

One particularly concerning implication is that a compromised television could potentially be used as a surveillance device.

A television is unusual compared with a typical computer because people often leave it permanently installed in a room where private conversations take place.

Depending on the model, it can also have microphones and connections to other devices.

If an attacker gains sufficient privileges, the television could therefore become more than a passive display.

It could become a foothold inside a household network.

This is why the security aspect of the investigation may ultimately be more important than the advertising-data controversy.

Advertising-related data collection is generally governed by privacy policies and user-consent mechanisms.

A remotely exploitable vulnerability is a different category of risk because it could allow an unauthorized party to bypass the assumptions behind those controls.

What is Automatic Content Recognition?

A major part of LG’s smart-TV business involves Automatic Content Recognition, or ACR.

ACR technology attempts to identify what is being displayed or played on a television.

Depending on the implementation, this can involve analyzing audio characteristics or other signals to determine what program, advertisement or content a viewer is consuming.

The resulting information can be used to understand viewing behavior.

LG says its ACR technology uses audio fingerprinting rather than storing the actual audio recording of the content being watched.

The company says ACR does not collect screenshots, screen recordings, video recordings or voice recordings for this purpose.

Where enabled, ACR-related information can support audience segmentation and viewing-trend analysis.

LG also says interest-based and cross-device advertising require separate consent.

This is where the investigation connects the technical capabilities of a smart TV to LG’s advertising business.

LG Ad Solutions is an important part of the story

LG is not only a television manufacturer.

Its advertising division, LG Ad Solutions, operates a connected-TV advertising business that uses television viewing information to help advertisers understand audiences.

The Gamers Nexus investigation highlighted statements from LG advertising executives describing the company’s ability to understand households and the secondary devices associated with them.

The investigation cited LG’s public figures showing a global footprint of approximately 216 million LG smart TVs and a U.S. network involving hundreds of millions of addressable secondary devices.

The 216 million figure should not be interpreted as the number of televisions researchers tested.

It is a figure associated with LG Ad Solutions’ stated reach.

That distinction is critical.

Researchers examined a limited number of devices and used those tests to demonstrate capabilities and vulnerabilities. They did not test 216 million televisions individually.

Therefore, a headline saying “216 million LG TVs were caught recording conversations” would overstate the evidence.

A more accurate description is that researchers investigated LG’s smart-TV platform and demonstrated potentially serious data-collection and security capabilities on tested devices.

LG’s response

LG has strongly rejected the central allegation that its televisions continuously record ambient conversations.

In its September 12 statement, LG said its smart TVs do not continuously record or transmit users’ conversations.

The company said speech-to-text processing begins only when a user activates voice interaction through a supported wake word or presses the voice or AI button on the remote.

LG also explained that supported TVs may monitor for the wake word while in standby when hands-free voice control has been enabled.

According to the company, audio that does not contain the recognized wake word is processed locally and promptly discarded.

LG further said voice data is not stored offline and uploaded later when the television reconnects.

That last point directly conflicts with the interpretation presented by researchers from their testing.

Because of that disagreement, the strongest editorial position is not to declare one side definitively correct where independent verification remains unavailable.

The investigation demonstrated what researchers say they observed.

LG has provided a different explanation of how the system is designed to work.

Those claims should remain clearly separated.

LG does acknowledge network scanning

There is one area where the two sides are closer.

LG acknowledges that its televisions use device-discovery functionality to identify and communicate with compatible devices.

The company describes this as a standard function of smart TVs and connected-home devices.

The stated purpose includes discovering equipment such as set-top boxes, game consoles, DVD players and other compatible devices.

That means the fundamental existence of network discovery is not disputed.

The disagreement is more about what the information means and how broadly it should be interpreted.

Researchers view the capability as an important privacy concern because a television can identify devices that have nothing directly to do with watching television.

LG says device discovery is used for connectivity and is separate from household profiling, cross-device targeting and advertising segmentation.

That separation is important when describing the findings.

Why smart-TV privacy is becoming a business issue

The LG investigation reflects a broader transformation in the television market.

Televisions were once primarily hardware products.

Consumers bought a screen, connected it to a cable box or antenna and watched content.

Smart TVs changed that model.

Modern televisions are connected computers with operating systems, app stores, microphones, network interfaces, advertising systems and increasingly sophisticated data-collection capabilities.

The hardware can therefore become an ongoing source of behavioral information.

For manufacturers, this creates another revenue opportunity.

Television hardware can be sold once, but viewing data and advertising can potentially generate recurring revenue.

This helps explain why connected-TV advertising has become an important part of the technology industry.

It also creates a fundamental tension.

Consumers generally think of a television as something they own.

Advertising platforms may view the same television as a sensor that can provide information about viewing behavior and the connected household.

The LG controversy exposes that tension particularly clearly.

What users should understand about consent

LG says voice recognition, ACR and interest-based advertising are optional features.

The company’s September statement says users can review, manage or withdraw relevant agreements through their TV settings.

That means users should not assume every data-intensive function is necessarily enabled in the same way on every model or in every market.

TV software can differ by model, country, webOS version and service availability.

Privacy settings can also change after software updates.

For users concerned about data collection, the practical approach is therefore to examine the privacy and consent settings on the specific television rather than relying on a general statement about all LG TVs.

Users should also keep the television’s software updated.

If a smart TV is being used in a particularly sensitive environment, network segmentation or disabling unnecessary connected functions can reduce the potential attack surface.

For users who do not need built-in smart-TV functions, treating the television as a display and using a separately managed streaming device can provide another layer of control.

However, external streaming devices have their own privacy and security considerations.

The investigation does not prove every LG TV is spying

This is the most important qualification for readers.

The phrase “216 million spy TVs” comes from the title of the Gamers Nexus investigation and LG Ad Solutions’ reported global reach figure.

It does not mean researchers tested 216 million televisions.

Nor does the investigation establish that every LG television continuously records conversations.

The research is better understood as a demonstration of what selected LG TVs and their software could do under tested conditions, including conditions involving exploitation of security vulnerabilities.

That is still significant.

A smart TV does not need to be secretly recording every conversation for its privacy architecture to deserve scrutiny.

The ability to discover devices, process viewing information, maintain network connectivity and potentially expose microphones through vulnerabilities creates a meaningful security and privacy surface.

The key question is whether those capabilities are proportionate, transparent and adequately protected.

What this means for the wider smart-TV market

The controversy is unlikely to remain limited to LG.

Smart-TV manufacturers across the industry have built advertising and analytics systems around connected television viewing.

ACR is used in different forms by multiple companies, and connected-TV advertising is now a major industry.

The LG investigation therefore raises a broader consumer question:

How much data should a television be allowed to collect simply because it is connected to the internet?

That question becomes more difficult as televisions gain more sensors and AI features.

Future smart TVs may include more sophisticated microphones, cameras and AI assistants.

The distinction between a television and a general-purpose computing device will become increasingly blurred.

That makes security updates, transparent consent and understandable privacy controls more important.

What happens next

The immediate issue is likely to be technical and regulatory scrutiny of the findings.

Researchers have reported vulnerabilities through responsible-disclosure processes, meaning additional technical information may emerge once fixes are available.

LG has already published a detailed explanation of its privacy architecture and says it operates a bug-bounty program and security processes for identifying and addressing vulnerabilities.

The company says eligible TV products receive security updates for up to five years from the initial release of the applicable webOS platform version, subject to its support policies.

For consumers, the practical question is whether LG’s explanations and future software changes adequately address the concerns raised by researchers.

For the broader industry, the more important question is whether smart-TV manufacturers will make data collection and security controls understandable enough that consumers can make genuinely informed choices.

The Bigger Picture

The LG investigation is not simply a story about whether a television is “spying.”

It is a story about what happens when a consumer appliance becomes a networked computer, advertising platform and sensor system at the same time.

The research demonstrated that tested LG TVs could see far more of their digital environment than many consumers might expect. It also showed how software vulnerabilities could potentially turn legitimate hardware capabilities into security risks.

LG’s response is equally important. The company disputes continuous ambient recording, explains that voice recognition requires an activated interaction and says optional data-driven services are controlled through user agreements.

The disagreement demonstrates why privacy reporting needs to distinguish between capability, normal operation and exploitation.

A television being technically capable of capturing microphone data under an exploited condition is not the same as LG routinely recording every household conversation.

But neither should consumers ignore the security implications of that capability.

Looking Ahead

The next phase of this story will depend on independent verification, vulnerability disclosures and LG’s software response. If researchers publish additional technical evidence after responsible-disclosure periods end, it should become easier to determine which behaviors are ordinary webOS functions and which depend on exploitable vulnerabilities.

The larger issue will outlast this particular investigation. As TVs become increasingly connected to advertising systems, AI assistants and home networks, manufacturers will have to convince consumers that convenience does not come at the cost of invisible surveillance or poorly protected sensors.

FAQs

Can LG TVs record conversations?

LG says its TVs do not continuously record ambient conversations. The company says voice processing begins when a user activates a voice interaction through a supported wake word or the remote-control voice button. Researchers from Gamers Nexus reported capturing voice data and transcripts during their testing, including demonstrations involving exploited vulnerabilities. The two claims should not be treated as equivalent.

Did researchers prove that all 216 million LG TVs are recording people?

No. The 216 million figure refers to LG’s reported global smart-TV reach used in its advertising business. Researchers tested selected LG TVs and extrapolated the significance of the findings to the wider installed base. The investigation did not test 216 million individual televisions.

Can LG TVs see other devices on a home network?

LG acknowledges that its smart TVs use device-discovery functions to identify compatible devices. Researchers reported that tested TVs could identify multiple other devices on local networks, including phones, computers and smart-home equipment. LG says this functionality is intended to support device connectivity and is separate from advertising profiling.

What is ACR on an LG TV?

Automatic Content Recognition, or ACR, is technology designed to identify content being viewed on a television. LG says its ACR system uses audio fingerprinting to identify supported content and that optional ACR-related information can be used for audience segmentation and viewing analysis. LG says interest-based and cross-device advertising require separate consent.

Should LG TV owners be worried?

The findings warrant attention, particularly around software vulnerabilities and network privacy, but the evidence does not support saying that every LG TV is continuously spying on its owner. Users should keep their TV software updated, review privacy settings and disable optional data-collection features they do not need.